Abstract. We address the problem of providing a logical characterization of reasoning based on stereotypes. Following [6] we take a semantic perspective and we base our model on a notion of semantic distance. While still leading to cumulative reasoning, our notion of distance does, unlike Lehmann's, allow reasoning under inconsistent information. Key words: Stereotypes, prototypes, cumulative reasoning, nonmonotonic logic, default-assumption logic.
One important feature of intelligent reasoning consists in the capability of associating specific situations to general patterns and by doing so, extending one's initial knowledge. Reasoning based on stereotypes is a case in point. Loosely speaking, a stereotype can be thought of as an individual whose characteristics are such that it represents a typical (i.e. generic) individual of the class it belongs to. For this reason a stereotypical individual can be expected to satisfy the key properties which are typically true of the class to which the individual belongs (see Section 2 below for an example). Of course exceptions might be waiting just around the corner and an intelligent agent must be ready to face a situation in which the properties projected on a specific individual by using stereotypical information turn out not to apply. Stereotypical reasoning is therefore defeasible.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a logical insight on the problem of modelling rational stereotypical reasoning. Our central idea consists in representing the latter as a two-stage inference process along the following lines. Given a piece of specific information, an agent selects among some background information available to it, those stereotypes which better fit the factual information at hand. We expect this to normally expand the initial information available to the agent. The second step is properly inferential: using the new (possibly expanded) information set the agent draws defeasible conclusions about the situation at hand. The key ingredient in the formalization of the first stage is a function which ranks the fitness of a set of stereotypes with respect to some factual information. Following [6] we interpret fitness in terms of a semantic distance function. Due to the defeasible nature of reasoning based on stereotypes, the inferential stage will have to be formalized by a non monotonic consequence relation. Since we are interested in representing rational reasoning, we shall be asking for this consequence relation to be particularly well-behaved. In our model this amount to requiring that stereotypical reasoning should be cumulative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage for our discussion on stereotypes and provides a general characterization of semantic distance. Section 3 is devoted to recall some basic facts about non monotonic reasoning in general and default-assumption consequence in particular. We then review in Section 4 Lehmann's original proposal for distance-based stereotypical reasoning and we highlight a basic shortcoming of such model. We attempt to fix this in Section 5 where we propose a semantic distance for information which is potentially inconsistent with an agent's defaults. While overcoming the limitation of Lehmann's model, the distance function introduced there fails to lead to full cumulative reasoning. We then combine the intuition behind both distances in Section 6 where we define a lexicographic distance function which at the same time admits inconsistency and leads to cumulative consequence relations.
Before getting into the main topic of this paper, let us fix some notation. We denote by the set of sentences built-up from the finite set propositional letters P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } using the classical propositional connectives {¬, ∧, ∨, →} in the usual, recursive way. We denote by lowercase Greek letters α, β, γ, . . ., the sentences of while sets of such sentences will be denoted by capital Roman letters A, B, C, . . .. As usual we denote consequence relations by and | ∼. In particular, denotes the classical (Tarskian) consequence relation while we use | ∼ (with various decorations) for non-monotonic consequence relations. Since it is sometimes handier to work with inference operations rather than consequence operations, we shall use Cl for the classical inference operation, that is Cl(A) = {β|A β} and C (with decorations) for the non monotonic ones, that is C(A) = {β|A | ∼ β}.
Semantically, we take sets of classical (binary) propositional valuations on the language W = {w, v, . . .} interpreted as a possible states of the world. Then we also use for the satisfaction relation between valuations and formulae where w α reads as 'The valuation w satisfies the formula α'. Given A ⊆ and a set W , we shall write [A] W to indicate the set of the valuations in W which satisfy all the sentences in A ([A] W = {w ∈ W | w φ for every φ ∈ A}). We shall drop the subscript and write simply [A] whenever the reference to the particular set of valuations is irrelevant.
Stereotypes
Stereotypes have been vastly investigated in a number of areas, from the philosophy of mind to the cognitive sciences, for their key role in the development of theories of concept-formation and commonsense reasoning (for an overview, see e.g. [5] ). Stereotypes feature prominently in Putnam's social characterization of meaning ( [10] ) as well as in most of the current approaches to conceptualization. The following remark by Lackoff points out the importance of stereotypes in commonsense and uncertain reasoning:
"Most actual cases of prototype phenomena simply are not used in 'identification'. They are used instead in thought -making inferences, doing calculations, making approximations, planning, comparing, making judgments, and so on -as well as in defining categories, extending them, and characterizing relations among subcategories. Prototypes do a great deal of the real work of mind, and have a wide use in rational processes." [4] , p.418
To fix a little our ideas on stereotypes, let us take a class of individuals, 'birds', for example; a stereotype bird can be thought as a set of properties defining an individual bird that we consider to be particularly representative of the very concept of a bird. In this case, then, those properties could be identifying a robin or some other little tree-bird. Hence, if we take a logical perspective on the problem, we can think of stereotypes as a set of states that typically, but not necessarily, are true of some particularly representative members of a class (a stereotypical bird will be a flying winged animal, of little dimensions, covered with feathers, with a beak, laying eggs, singing, nesting on trees, etc.). This idea suggests identifying a stereotype with a finite set of sentences ∆ = {α 1 , . . . , α m } which are true exaclty at those states which characterize the stereotype. We denote by S, T, . . . finite sets of stereotypes (S = {∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n }).
In our interpretation, a set of stereotypes represents the stereotypical or default information available to an agent. This interpretation is justified by recalling that in defeasible reasoning, defaults refer to those pieces of information that an agent considers to be typically, normally, usually, etc. true. So, by taking stereotypical properties as defaults, we capture the idea that an agent considers stereotypical information as defeasible, and hence possibly revisable in the event of evidence to the contrary.
The close connection between defeasible and stereotypical reasoning has been brought to the logician's attention by D. Lehmann ([6] ) who proposes a model for stereotypical reasoning along the following lines. An agent starts with a set of n stereotypes, S = {∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n }, and is then given information about some particular individual, represented by a factual formula α. This fixes what the agent considers true of the state of the world at hand. The idea then is that an agent's reasoning depends on "how good" α is as a stereotype in S. In order to capture this formally, Lehmann introduces a notion of semantic distance d(α, ∆) between the factual and the stereotypical information available to the agent. The smaller the distance d, the better factual information "fits" the stereotype ∆. To take good advantage of stereotypical reasoning, then, the agent should associate to the factual information at hand the nearest stereotype. More precisely, given α and every stereotype ∆ i in S, the agent selects a subset of S, S α d , of maximally close (i.e. nearest) elements of S to α with respect to d. This is interpreted as the set of stereotypes which is natural for the agent to associate to α. Formally:
The selection of the nearest stereotypes to a formula α leads naturally to defeasible reasoning which is captured by the consequence relation | ∼ S,d . For obvious reasons we refer to this latter as the consequence relation generated by S and d. To recap, the model goes as follows. An agent is equipped with a finite set of stereotypes S and a semantic distance function d. Given a factual formula α, the agent selects the set S Thus, before recalling the constraints imposed by Lehmann on the distance function d and the properties of the generated consequence relation, we need to recall some basic facts about non monotonic consequence relations.
Cumulative and Default-Assumption Consequence Relations
Among the many proposals to characterize defeasible reasoning (see [2] for an overview) some core structural properties emerge as particularly compelling (see [3] , [8] , and [9] ). In particular, the class of cumulative consequence relations has gained quite a consensus in the community as the industry standard.
Definition 1 (Cumulative Consequence Relations).
A consequence relation | ∼ is cumulative if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
where denotes as usual the tarskian consequence relation of classical logic.
Combing the flexibility of nonmonotonic (i.e. default, revisable, defeasible, etc.) reasoning with many desirable metalogical properties, such as idempotence, supraclassicality, and full-absorption (see [8] ), cumulative consequence relations constitute a tool of choice in the formalization of commonsense inference.
Among the class of cumulative consequence relations are the so-called defaultassumption consequence relations, which will play a key role in our model and which we therefore turn to recall. The idea behind default-assumption reasoning is that an agent's information can be viewed as being two-fold. On the one hand agents have defeasible information, a set ∆ of defaults that an agent presumes to be typically true. On the other hand agents might acquire factual information, that is, information that the agent takes as true of the particular situation at hand, and which is represented, in our setting, by a single formula α. Intuitively, then, default-assumption reasoning takes place when an agent extends its factual information α with those defaults which are compatible with α and takes the result as premises for its inferences.
In order to formalize this we need to define the set of maximally α-consistent subsets of ∆, or, equivalently, the notion of remainder set.
Definition 2 (Remainder Sets). For B a set of formulae and α a formula, the remainder set B⊥α ('B less α') is the set of sets of formulae such that A ∈ B⊥α if and only if:
There is no set A such that A ⊆ A ⊆ B, and α / ∈ Cl(A )
Thus, for a set of defaults ∆, ∆⊥¬α is the set of every maximal subsets of ∆ consistent with α. Default-assumption consequence relation can then be defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Default-assumption consequence relation). β is a defaultassumption consequence of α given a set of default-assumptions ∆, (written α | ∼ ∆ β) if and only if β is a classical consequence of the union of α and every set in ∆⊥¬α:
It is well-known that default-assumption consequence relations are cumulative (see e.g. [1] and [9] ).
3 Lehmann's model [6] puts forward a set of intuitive constraints that the semantic distance d should satisfy in order to generate a well-behaved consequence relation | ∼ S,d . We denote by δ Lehmann's distance function and by S α δ the set of stereotypes in S selected by δ with respect to a factual formula α as in ( ) above. Finally we denote by | ∼ S,δ the consequence relation generated by S and δ.
Recall that the stereotypes in S α δ , are meant be those which fit better the factual information represented by α i.e. those with minimal semantic distance from α. Thus, it is natural to capture this by looking at the overlap between the states of the world which make α and a set of stereotypes ∆ true. But such states are precisely the models of α and the models of ∆ ([α] and [∆], respectively). The idea is obviously that greatest overlap means maximal closeness. So, given a set of stereotypes S and a factual formula α, Lehmann requires that:
• For every ∆ ∈ S, δ(α, ∆) should be anti-monotonic with respect to [ 
(the larger the overlap, the smaller the distance).
• For every ∆ ∈ S, δ(α, ∆) should be monotonic with respect to
(the larger the set of states which satisfy the defaults but not the factual information, the larger the distance).
The following simplifying assumption is also made:
• |S α δ | = 1 (i.e. for every α and S, the agent selects exactly one element in S).
The above constraints are formalized by:
The generated consequence relation | ∼ S,δ is then defined by adding the information of the only default set ∆ α δ in S α δ to the premise set α:
For any distance function δ satisfying (L1), Lehmann proves the following result: To see the importance of the result, let us observe one of its consequences through namely the fact that | ∼ S,δ satisfies Cautious Monotonicity. Suppose that α stands for the fact that Sherkan is a big feline with a black-striped, tawny coat. Then it is natural to associate Sherkan to the stereotype of the tiger and then using this information to conclude that Sherkan has also long teeth (α | ∼ S,δ β) and is a predator (α | ∼ S,δ γ). Reasonably then, if we add to our premises the information that Sherkan has long teeth, we should continue to consider it to be a tiger and, consequently, a predator (α ∧ β | ∼ S,δ γ). Intuitive as it may be, Lehmann's model has a significant shortcoming. The problem lies in the requirement that in order for stereotypical reasoning to take place, there should be a nonempty intersection between the factual information at hand and the agent's set of stereotypes. In other words, Lehmann does not take into account the possibility that every stereotype in S is inconsistent with the premise α. In such a case, then by the definition of | ∼ S,δ , we could set the distance between the premise and a stereotype to ∞ (i.e. the largest the distance according to δ):
So, any choice of stereotypes here is admissible, making stereotypical reasoning basically vacuous (that is, S α δ = S). This shortcoming reduces significantly the scope of Lehmann's model for one key feature of stereotypical reasoning is precisely the fact that an individual can be related to a stereotype even if its properties do not match all the properties of the stereotype so that we can derive defeasible conclusions on the basis of the pieces of stereotypical information compatible with the premises. For example, knowing that Tweety is a penguin, we can reason about it using the information contained in the stereotype of a bird excluding the information that is known to be inconsistent with being a penguin (flying, nesting in trees, etc.).
A Semantic Distance for Inconsistent Information.
So we now focus on the situation in which every stereotype available to an agent turns out to be inconsistent with its factual information. More precisely we define a notion of semantic distance, ε, with the idea of capturing the distance between a formula α and a set of α-inconsistent default sets. If there are no α-consistent stereotypes, we allow the choice of the 'nearest' α-inconsistent default sets. This new notion of distance has clearly an effect on the associated consequence relation | ∼ S,ε which essentially amounts to moving from the classical relation , used by Lehmann in (L| ∼), to a default-assumption consequence relation | ∼ ∆ . Note that by definition 3 above, if the set {α} ∪∆ is consistent , we have α | ∼ ∆ β if and only if {α} ∪ ∆ β, as in Lehmann's definition.
We begin by recalling the notion of semantic distance proposed by Lehmann, Magidor and Schlechta [7] in the context of belief revision. We claim that this is appropriate as a measure of 'consistency distance' between formulae. For an arbitrary set Z we say that ε is a semantic pseudo-distance function
if it satisfies the following:
(ε1) The set Z is totally ordered by a strict order < (ε2) Z has a <-smallest element 0, and ε(w, v) = 0 if and only if w = v Note that is not required to be symmetric (i.e. ε(w, v) = ε(v, w) for every w, v ∈ U ). This is matches our intuitive interpretation of distance. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, an agent should have different attitudes towards the information represented by the fist argument of the distance function, that refers to what the agent takes to be certainly true, and the second argument, which concerns default information.
Again, the distance between two given sets of formulae A and B is semantic as it is defined with respect to their models [A] and [B] , and the distance between two sets of valuations U and U (U, U ⊆ W ) is set to be the minimal distance between the valuations in U and U :
In analogy with equation ( ) above, given a finite set S of default sets {∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n } and a formula α, S α ε is identified with the set of ε-'nearest' default sets in S to α.
From now on we relax Lehmann's assumption that S α must contain a single default set, thus allowing the possibility that, under the uncertainty connected to the presence of inconsistencies, a set of premises is taken to be equally distant from distinct default sets.
A few observations are in order. Note that since ε is a total function, S = ∅ implies S A ε = ∅. Note also that it makes no difference if we use as arguments ε sets of formulae A or sets of valuations [A] . That is, we ε(α, ∆) = ε([α], [∆]) for every α,∆. Finally, since ε satisfies (ε2), if a factual formula and a default set are mutually consistent, then the distance between them is 0, as they share at least a valuation. Hence, the default sets which turn out to be consistent with our set of premises have, intuitively, priority over those which are inconsistent.
We can now define | ∼ S,ε using default-assumption consequence relations:
Note that the corresponding inference operation is
where C ∆ is the inference operation corresponding to the default-assumption consequence relation | ∼ ∆ . | ∼ S,ε so defined satisfies some properties of cumulative consequence relations. Proof. Assume a formula α and a set of stereotypes S. By means of our distance function ε, we can identify the set S Note that this satisfies both (d1) and (d2). Now, from these assumptions we get p | ∼ S,ε r, p | ∼ S,ε t, since C S,ε (p) = C ∆ (p), but, since C S,ε (p ∧ r) = C ∆ (p ∧ r), we also get p ∧ r | ∼ S,ε ¬t, violating cautious monotony.
To get cumulativity, we need ε to satisfy a further constrain which intuitively ensures that given a premise α and a default set ∆, there is some valuation satisfying both α and a maximal α-consistent subset of ∆ that is at least as near to ∆ as any other valuation in [α] . To formalize this we first define [∆⊥α] as the set of valuations satisfying at least one element of the remainder set ∆⊥α (see definition 2):
[∆⊥α] = {[B]|B ∈ ∆⊥α}
We can now define the required new constraint
We now prove a series of lemmas leading to the result that if ε satisfies (ε1) − (ε3), then the generated consequence relation | ∼ S,ε is cumulative.
. Hence, we have that α ∧ β | ∼ ∆ γ and α | ∼ ∆ β for every ∆ ∈ S α ε . Since every such | ∼ ∆ , being cumulative, satisfies CT, we have α | ∼ ∆ γ for every ∆ ∈ S α ε , i.e. α | ∼ S,ε γ.
Thus our notion of distance captures the stereotypical reasoning underlying Lehmann's approach while preserving the cumulativity of the generated consequence relation in the general case in which an agent's factual information comes out to be inconsistent with its stereotypical information. However, this revised distance function looses its appeal if more than one stereotype is consistent with an agent's factual information. In such a case, by (ε2), an agent cannot distinguish between the stereotypes in S that are consistent with α, since their mutual distance is always 0.
A Lexicographic Combination of δ and
Summing up what has been done so far, we started by reviewing Lehmann's notion of distance δ and noted that while logically well-behaved (generates cumulative consequence relations) it suffers from the drawback of not handling inconsistency between factual and default information. In order to overcome this limitation we considered a semantic pseudo-distance ε, which again leads to cumulative reasoning, but which, at the same time, allows an agent to face the situation in which its factual information turns out to be inconsistent with its default information. The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to study a combination of the two approaches which enables us to refine pseudo-distance ε in order to let this latter distinguish between the stereotypes consistent with α. To do this we define a lexicographic ordering of a distance d lex , with the idea that the precedence should be given whenever possible to ε over δ. More precisely:
Given a set of stereotypes S, a semantic distance d lex and a formula α, we define, again in analogy with equation ( ), the set S α ε of the stereotypes in S which are nearest to α. | ∼ S,d lex is defined analogously to | ∼ S,ε , using defaultassumption consequence relations as in equation (*). We devote the rest of this paper to show that d lex does indeed combine the best of ε and δ since it eventually leads to cumulative reasoning.
Recall that, given a set of stereotypes S, a semantic distance d lex , defined lexicographically over two distances ε and δ, and a formula α, we indicate by S We now have all the ingredients to prove our central result. 
Conclusions
We have addressed the problem of providing a logical characterization of reasoning based on stereotypes and we presented a model which combines two basic intuitions. On the one hand, stereotypical reasoning requires an agent to choose, given a piece of factual information, how this can be extended by relying on some background information about its class. This puts the agent in a new epistemic state (usually richer than the original one) which can be used to reason non-monotonically. Our central result shows that if we put appropriate constraints on the selection of stereotypes -in our case by using appropriate distance functions -we can generate a cumulative non monotonic consequence relation which is widely regarded in the field as capturing some fundamental aspects of commonsensical reasoning.
